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The term moral hazard generally implies individuals’ tendency to exercise less effort into cost reduction if the negative con-
sequences resulting from their actions are not borne by themselves. This paper analyzes using recent experimental studies
under which circumstances moral hazard is likely to occur and how this problem could be mitigated or eliminated. A detailed
overview and analysis of field and laboratory experiments from different areas are provided. At first, a description of the
experimental process is presented. The paper then concentrates on findings and, additionally, on the discussion of the ethod-
ology. Overall, the results suggest moral hazard to be an important problem in many markets. However, it is found out that
experts without personal financial incentives do not respond to customers’ insurance status. Besides, competition mitigates
moral hazard on the supply side and evidence shows that moral hazard is less likely to occur in markets for natural disaster
insurance where probabilities of damages are low. Additionally, peer pressure and pro-social preferences alleviate the problem
of moral hazard in group schemes.
Keywords: First-degree moral hazard; second-degree moral hazard; experiments; analysis.
1. Introduction
Moral hazard is an issue that can occur in many differ-
ent areas, but since information plays an important role,
especially in insurance markets, numerous studies concern-
ing moral hazard focus on those (Richter et al., 2014). For
instance, evidence from empirical studies in the context of
health insurance indicates a strong positive correlation be-
tween health insurance coverage and health expenditures
while different possible explanations for this finding exist
(Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2017): On the one hand, high-
risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance which
refers to the problem of adverse selection. On the other hand,
insured individuals demand more services or more expensive
ones since their out-of-pocket costs are lower with insurance,
a problem known as first-degree moral hazard. Another ex-
planation is that physicians provide more services than nec-
essary or more expensive ones to insured patients who are
assumed to care less about the costs because costs are cov-
ered by insurance, a second-degree moral hazard problem.
In order to analyze moral hazard, it is inevitable to differ-
entiate between adverse selection, first-degree and second-
degree moral hazard since the phenomena are equivalent in
terms of final outcomes, but the underlying mechanisms are
different (Balafoutas et al., 2017). Therefore, this paper an-
alyzes by means of recent experimental studies under which
circumstances moral hazard emerges and which features mit-
igate or eliminate this issue completely.
The first section of the main part contains experiments
on second-degree moral hazard i.e., supply side responses to
first-degree moral hazard (Balafoutas et al., 2017). Particu-
larly, it is investigated how reimbursement by a third party
affects service providers’ behavior and whether eliminating
financial incentives for providers or allowing for competition
influences the degree of moral hazard. The presented stud-
ies concentrate on markets for credence goods since moral
hazard is assumed to be specifically relevant in such mar-
kets because of the high degree of informational asymmetry
between expert sellers and consumers (e.g., markets for re-
pair services or health care). Only experts know which qual-
ity of service is needed while customers can only observe ex
post whether the problem is solved, but if so, they cannot be
sure of having received adequate treatment (Balafoutas et al.,
2017; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). It is assumed that
this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for ser-
vice providers to overtreat, undertreat and overcharge (Ker-
schbamer et al., 2016). Especially, if providers know that
consumers do not bear the costs and are, consequently, less
price sensitive. Overtreatment (or overprovision) means that
sellers provide higher quality or quantity of the service than
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5282/jums/v5i4pp410-428
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needed to solve the customers’ problem (e.g., taxi drivers tak-
ing passengers on detours) while undertreatment (or under-
provision) relates to a situation where the service is insuf-
ficient (Kerschbamer et al., 2016). Overcharging is a case
where experts charge for more than actually provided (e.g.,
computer repair experts charging the replacement of a mod-
ule which has not been replaced) (Kerschbamer and Sutter,
2017). The results from the experiments show that experts
without personal financial incentives did not respond to cus-
tomers’ insurance status (Lu, 2014). In addition, competi-
tion mitigated moral hazard on the supply side (Huck et al.,
2016).
The second part of the paper concentrates on first-degree
moral hazard i.e., individuals’ tendency to exercise less ef-
fort if the negative consequences resulting from their actions
are not borne by themselves (Balafoutas et al., 2017). It is
investigated whether moral hazard exists in a market for nat-
ural distaster risk insurance. As in the case of second-degree
moral hazard, first-degree moral hazard has not only been
observed in insurance markets, but also in many different ar-
eas such as credit and labor markets. For instance, a person
working in a team can free ride and trust on the other team
members’ performance when individuals are paid according
to the team output (Holmstrom, 1982). Therefore, also ex-
periments on joint liability group schemes are discussed. As
a result, evidence suggests that moral hazard is less likely to
occur in markets for natural disaster insurance where prob-
abilities of damages are low (Mol and Botzen, 2018). In ad-
dition, experimenters found out that peer pressure and pro-
social preferences alleviate the problem of moral hazard in
group schemes (Corgnet et al., 2013; Biener et al., 2018).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The
next section briefly defines the term “moral hazard”, explains
the different types and distinguishes this problem from ad-
verse selection. The aim of section 3 is to analyze moral haz-
ard by using experimental studies from different areas. A de-
tailed overview1 of recent field and laboratory experiments
is provided, due to structural reasons, first on second-degree
and second on first-degree moral hazard. A description of
the experimental process is for each experiment presented at
first. The paper then concentrates on the results and, addi-
tionally, on the discussion of the experimental methodology.
Finally, section 4 draws a conclusion and points out possible
academic voids which can guide to future research topics.
2. Moral Hazard in Theory
2.1. Definition
The term “moral hazard” has its origin in the insurance
literature. Arrow (1963, p. 961) defined it in the context of
health insurance as the observation that “medical insurance
increases the demand for medical care”. Therefore, moral
1Due to space constraints, it is not possible to present a broader overview
in this paper since the research question requires a detailed discussion of
experiments.
hazard can be viewed as an insurance-induced behavior mod-
ification of individuals (Karten et al., 2018) – meaning that
an individual with more insurance coverage has weaker in-
centives to prevent losses and therefore insured events will
occur more often compared to an individual with less or no
coverage (Balafoutas et al., 2017). However, since moral
hazard is not only an issue in insurance markets, the term
generally implies individuals’ tendency to exercise less effort
into cost reduction if the negative consequences resulting
from their actions are not borne by themselves (Balafoutas
et al., 2017). The phenomenon of moral hazard – as of ad-
verse selection2 – arises from an asymmetry of information
between contracting parties (Holmström, 1979; Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1991). Specifically, this asymmetry occurs ex post3
(Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) and is associated with hid-
den action i.e., the probability distribution of observable out-
comes is dependent on agents’ actions which are unobserv-
able for the contracting party (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991).
2.2. Types of Moral Hazard
According to the literature on insurance theory (e.g.,
Nell, 1998), moral hazard can be classified into several types
which are represented in Figure 1. At first, it can be divided
into the legal and the illegal moral hazard. The illegal type is
insurance fraud which requires a material misrepresentation
(e.g., lie or concealment), the intention to deceive and the
aim to realize unauthorized benefits (Viaene and Dedene,
2004).4
The legal type is subdivided into the external and the in-
ternal moral hazard. External moral hazard (second-degree
moral hazard) references to third parties who may change
their behavior based on their customers’ insurance coverage
whereas the internal type corresponds to the insured indi-
viduals’ behavior (first-degree moral hazard) (Karten et al.,
2018). The former is defined as the supply side’s tendency to
increase the price or the extent of a service when moral haz-
ard on the demand side is expected since the demand side is
less price sensitive due to insurance (Balafoutas et al., 2017).
The second legal form includes ex ante and ex post moral
hazard: Ex ante moral hazard refers to an insured individ-
ual’s behavior to spend less effort in reducing the likelihood
of a loss (Einav and Finkelstein, 2018; Ehrlich and Becker,
1972). For instance, an individual with health insurance
coverage may have fewer incentives to avoid an unhealthy
lifestyle (e.g., smoking) since insurance covers the resulting
financial costs. The degree to which a subject’s demand for
healthcare is influenced by the out-of-pocket price he has to
pay for the care is described as ex post moral hazard (Pauly,
1968; Einav and Finkelstein, 2018) i.e., if an uninsured per-
son would not have visited a doctor because of an innocuous
disease, but he decided to do so because he was insured then
his behavior is attributed to ex post moral hazard. Einav and
2The problem of adverse selection is briefly addressed in section 2.3.
3“Ex post” relates to the conclusion of the (insurance) contract.
4The exact specification may vary between different systems of justice
(Viaene and Dedene, 2004).
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Figure 1: Types of Moral Hazard According to Nell (1998)5
Finkelstein (2018) argue that using “moral hazard” in this
context is an abuse of the term since an individual’s health-
care utilization (action) can be observed which means that
there is more a problem of hidden information about the per-
son’s health status than a problem of hidden action.
2.3. Distinction from Adverse Selection
As already mentioned beforehand, the situation of asym-
metrically distributed information can also lead to the prob-
lem of adverse selection which Arrow (1986) attributes to
hidden information. Under adverse selection, a subject is as-
sumed to have private information about his risk type prior
to the insurance contract relative to the insurance company
which creates an ex ante information asymmetry (Finkelstein
and McGarry, 2006). A person with private information that
he is a high risk is more likely to choose an insurance con-
tract with a higher coverage level than a person who believes
himself to be of a type of low risk (Finkelstein and McGarry,
2006). And consequently, the causality between coverage
and riskiness is reversed compared to moral hazard (Finkel-
stein and McGarry, 2006). A positive correlation between the
level of insurance coverage and the degree of riskiness can,
therefore, result from both, adverse selection and moral haz-
ard (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). This brings up difficul-
ties in clearly disentangling these two problems empirically.
However, this paper does neither concentrate on the analy-
sis of adverse selection nor on approaches to clearly disen-
tangle6 moral hazard and adverse selection since the experi-
ments presented in the following were designed in a way so
that the problem of adverse selection was eliminated.
5Own representation based on Nell (1998).
6Cohen and Siegelman (2010) discuss three approaches to the disentan-
glement in their paper.
3. Experimental Evidence on Moral Hazard
3.1. Second-Degree Moral Hazard
Balafoutas et al. (2017) were the first to study moral haz-
ard and its influence on market outcomes in a controlled field
experiment concentrating on the effect of first-degree moral
hazard on the behavior of the supply side. The authors pro-
vide evidence for second-degree moral hazard in a market
for taxi rides where costs were reimbursed by a third party.
In the experiment, four research assistants, two men and
two women, took undercover taxi rides in the capital city of
Greece following a fixed script and secretly documented the
drivers’ driving and charging behavior. The rides were orga-
nized in quadruples meaning that all four assistants took a
taxi from the same origin to the same destination in one or
two-minute intervals and at random order. Overall, the ex-
periment consisted of 400 rides while 200 were part of the
control treatment (CONTROL) and 200 were assigned to the
treatment with insurance (INS)7. The assistants explained to
the taxi drivers in both treatments that they were not familiar
with the city in order to create an information asymmetry. In
CONTROL, the assistants asked the drivers shortly after the
ride had begun for a receipt at the end of the ride (without
mentioning the purpose of this question) while in INS, it was
added that the receipt was needed since expenses were re-
imbursed by the passengers’ employers.8 At the end of the
experiment, the actual fares paid by the assistants were com-
pared to the correct prices. This was possible because charg-
ing fees for taxi rides are standardized in Greece: The tariff
consists of a fixed fee per ride and a variable part. This vari-
able part is either computed distance or duration-dependent
contingent on what is more profitable for the driver and the
7Reimbursement from the employer and insurance have comparable fi-
nancial consequences for the consumer (Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2017).
Therefore, and for consistency reasons, the treatment will be declared as an
insurance treatment.
8The authors state that, except for this additional information, both treat-
ments were identical.
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taximeter always applies the more profitable method auto-
matically.
Balafoutas et al. (2017) measured overtreatment along
two dimensions: The duration of the ride and the distance
driven. Table 1 shows the values of duration and distance
indices by gender and treatment. A comparison of the av-
erage duration index across treatments (1.14 in CONTROL
and 1.13 in INS) and across genders (1.13 for male and
1.14 for female passengers) did not reveal any significant
differences. In addition, the differences in values of the dis-
tance index were again insignificant across genders (1.06 for
males and 1.07 for females), but marginally significant be-
tween CONTROL (1.06) and INS (1.08). Therefore, only a
minor overtreatment effect along the distance dimension was
found. The authors state that the reasons for the small differ-
ences in the overtreatment index between treatments could
have been that overtreatment was associated with additional
costs of service as for example fuel costs or opportunity costs
of time. A passenger who does not have to bear the costs
for the taxi ride would probably not mind a higher price but
would complain about the duration of the ride longer than
necessary.
In Table 2 one can observe overcharging frequencies and
price indices across treatments and across genders. In CON-
TROL, 20% of taxi rides were overcharged while the over-
charging frequency was 37% in INS. According to the au-
thors, this indicates a statistically significant and causal ef-
fect of second-degree moral hazard. Additionally, the mean
overcharging amount by which taxi drivers increased the fare
was higher in INS (€ 1.43) compared to € 0.91 in CON-
TROL. Therefore, it is not surprising that the price index in-
creased after the moral hazard manipulation as can be ob-
served from Panel (b) in Table 2. This suggests that pas-
sengers’ expenditures increased compared to the absence of
second-degree moral hazard. The source of these results
could be the drivers’ assumption that, when employers reim-
burse the costs for the ride, passengers care less about higher
costs and hence overcharging behavior will be undetected
and not reported.
Another important finding was that in CONTROL, fe-
male passengers paid overcharged prices more frequently
(26%) than male passengers (13%)11 while the values were
almost similar across genders (36% and 37%, respectively)
in INS. Therefore, the difference in overcharging frequen-
cies between both treatments was highly significant only for
male passengers. Women could have been perceived as less
likely to complain about being overcharged in general which
explains the differences in overcharging between genders
in CONTROL. And since the additional information for the
driver about the employer paying for the ride did not change
9Balafoutas et al. (2017, p. 9); The columns CTR and MOH represent
results from CONTROL and INS, respectively.
10Balafoutas et al. (2017, p. 10); The columns CTR and MOH represent
results from CONTROL and INS, respectively.
11According to the authors, women were, ceteris paribus, 18.1% more
likely to face overcharging in CONTROL than men. This is shown in column
2 in Appendix 1.
this perception about women, the overcharging frequency
increased only by an insignificant amount of 10 percentage
points.
Passengers had to pay unjustified surcharges (e.g., trans-
port to the airport) in 77% of all overcharging cases. In the
remaining ones, drivers manipulated their taximeters, ap-
plied the night tariff during daytime or rounded up the price
by more than 5% of the fare. Overall, the experiment stresses
the importance for employers to reduce the extent of second-
degree moral hazard. As one possible solution, vertical in-
tegration with service providers (e.g., firm’s own chauffeur
service) may be implemented.
In the following, the experimental methodology will be
discussed. List (2006) argues that field experiments rep-
resent a bridge between laboratory and naturally-occurring
data. In relation to an experiment in the laboratory, the ex-
perimenter potentially has less control over the environment
in a field experiment since it is not possible to take all situ-
ational factors into account (Richter et al., 2014), but in ex-
change for more external validity i.e., realism increases (List
and Reiley, 2008). In the presented experiment, taxi drivers
were the population of interest being observed in their natu-
ral environment without knowing that they were being ana-
lyzed. This is important since different types of subjects may
behave differently i.e., students in the laboratory may behave
differently than real taxi drivers and subjects knowing that
they are being observed may also change their behavior (List
and Reiley, 2008). Another advantage of the methodology
was that first-degree moral hazard and adverse selection can
be excluded as sources for the found results since the assis-
tants’ behavior was exogenously controlled and held constant
by exact instructions and passengers were randomly assigned
to one of the two treatments (Balafoutas et al., 2017). An ad-
ditional benefit was that all four assistants took taxis in short
intervals from the same origin to the same destination in or-
der to make the prices comparable. Thus, factors influencing
the taxi driver’s choice of route (and thereby the price) as,
for instance, traffic or weather conditions were eliminated
(Balafoutas et al., 2017). It is important to note that the re-
sults from this experiment may not represent results in other
markets (or other countries) since the market for taxi rides
is highly specific and the experiment was conducted only in
the city of Athens.
Due to the fact that the market for taxi rides in Greece is
highly regulated and over-treatment and overcharging may
have different consequences for consumers in other markets,
Kerschbamer et al. (2016) confirm the importance of second-
degree moral hazard in a less specific market, the computer
repair market. For that purpose, the impact of customers’ in-
surance coverage on computer repair experts’ provision and
charging behavior was examined.
In the natural field experiment by Kerschbamer et al.
(2016), equally manipulated computers were brought to 61
randomly selected repair shops in Austria for a reparation.
One of the random-access memory modules was destruc-
ted in all computers which caused an unambiguous error
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Table 1: Overtreatment Indices9
Notes. Panel (a): The duration index is the ratio of time driven in each ride to time driven in the quickest ride in that particular quadruple. Panel (b):
The distance index is the ratio of distance driven in each ride to distance driven in the shortest ride in that particular quadruple. CTR refers to the control
treatment and MOH refers to the moral hazard treatment.
CIR MOH Overall average
Panel (a): duration index
Male passengers 1.124 1.135 1.130
Female passengers 1.152 1.126 1.139
Overall average 1.138 1.130 1.134
Panel (b): distance index
Male passengers 1.056 1.071 1.064
Female passengers 1.053 1.084 1.068
Overall average 1.055 1.077 1.066
Table 2: Overcharging Frequency and Price Index10
Notes. Panel (a): Overcharging frequency refers to the share of rides that have been classified as cases of overcharging. In parentheses, we report the mean
unconditional overcharging amount (which is zero if overcharging has not taken place). Panel (b): The price index is the ratio of total price paid in each ride
to the lowest total price paid in that particular quadruple. CTR refers to the control treatment and MOH refers to the moral hazard treatment.
CTR MOH Overall average
Panel (a): overcharging frequency (mean overcharging amount in parentheses, in € )
Male passengers 0.13 (0.72) 0.37 (1.46) 0.25 (1.09)
Female passengers 0.26 (1.10) 0.36 (1.40) 0.31 (1.25)
Overall average 0.20 (0.91) 0.37 (1.43) 0.28 (1.17)
Panel (b): price index
Male passengers 1.075 1.153 1.114
Female passengers 1.109 1.177 1.143
Overall average 1.092 1.165 1.129
message on the screen.12 Therefore, every computer expert
should have been able to diagnose and solve the problem.
According to the IT department, the repair should have been
completed within half an hour and for costs of € 60 to € 80.
The customer, an undercover experimenter, entered the shop,
asked for a repair and indicated that he was a non-computer
expert by mentioning that he had no idea why the computer
cannot be booted. Two different treatments were randomly
assigned to the shops: In CONTROL, the customer explained
before leaving the shop that he would need a bill after the
repair while in INS, the customer added that the bill was
needed for his insurance company because repair costs were
covered.13 After the reparation, the computers were checked
in order to find out what had been done to solve the booting
problem and whether the positions on the bill fit to the re-
pair actually undertaken. Finally, to investigate the motives
12According to the authors, the computers were in perfect condition aside
from the manipulation.
13Both treatments were completely identical except for this difference
(Kerschbamer et al., 2016).
for the differing behavior of sellers between treatments, the
authors conducted a survey where they asked experts from
15 repair shops why insurance might lead to higher prices for
customers.
The authors found out that the average price for the
repair increased by 83% from € 70.17 in CONTROL to
€ 128.68 in INS indicating a highly significant effect of the
insurance treatment. Figure 2 illustrates this large difference
by means of the relative cumulative frequencies of repair
prices. This finding is in line with what Balafoutas, Ker-
schbamer and Sutter found in the previous experiment.
Overtreatment yielded 29% of the price difference be-
tween the two treatments: In five cases, unnecessary re-
pairs – additional to the replacement of the defective mod-
ule – were carried out. The price for these five repairs was
€ 200.58 on average which was significantly higher than the
average price for the other repairs in INS (€ 112.34). In-
terestingly, all these repairs were made in INS and since the
computers were, except for the manipulation, in perfect con-
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Figure 2: Relative Cumulative Frequency of Repair Prices14
dition, this can be interpreted as overtreatment.
Moreover, overcharging explained the remaining 71% of
the price difference between CONTROL and INS: The authors
found no difference due to charged repairs that had not been
conducted,15 but overcharging in the working-time dimen-
sion was found – probably since the customer was not present
during diagnosis and repair. While no significant difference
in hourly rates between treatments (€ 87.47 on average) oc-
curred there was an increase in the charged working time of
85% from CONTROL (0.55h) to INS (1.02h).16 This strong
difference is also shown in Figure 3. The results from the
survey on the motives for overcharging and overtreatment in
the light of insurance – which are represented in Appendix 2
– showed that second-degree moral hazard was considered as
the most likely explanation. Experts expected the customers
to pay less attention to price minimization because of their
insurance coverage.
With reference to the methodology it should be men-
tioned that just as in the experiment by Balafoutas, Ker-
schbamer and Sutter, first-degree moral hazard and adverse
selection were ruled out in the experiment.17 The computers
were manipulated in a way that experts should have been
able to easily find the problem and, therefore, incompetence
was excluded as a reason for the differing behavior of ex-
perts. However, three shops out of 61 stated either that the
computer was irreparable or that a repair would be more ex-
pensive than buying a new computer suggesting that finding
14Kerschbamer et al. (2016, p. 7456)
15In four cases, the experts billed replacements of parts which had actually
not been replaced, but two of these cases occurred in CONTROL and two in
INS (Kerschbamer et al., 2016).
16Since only 29 shops indicated the rate per hour and working time on
the bill (and two observations were excluded due to overtreatment), these
numbers were computed from 27 observations.
17See the discussion of the methodology of the previous experiment for
an explanation.
the error was probably not as simple as expected. This may
be an issue because when experts spend more time on iden-
tifying the problem, the repair costs increase, consequently,
due to incompetence and not because of intended misbe-
havior (Kerschbamer et al., 2016). Therefore, it is possible
that parts of the overcharging effects in the working-time
dimension were solely attributed to incompetence. Another
problem may be that only 29 of all repair shops indicated the
working time and the hourly rate as a position on the bill. It
was not possible to observe whether the charged time was
used for repair or not, but it may be arguable that the number
of 27 observations (two excluded because of overtreatment)
was too small for drawing a justifiable conclusion on the
overcharging behavior. However, a positive course of action
was that observations implying overtreatment were excluded
from computing the effect of overcharging in the working-
time dimension since the replacement of additional parts of
the computer is positively correlated with the duration of the
working time. In regard to the survey, one may criticize the
number of interviewed experts.
In the previously discussed experimental studies, the sell-
ers of credence goods had financial incentives for behaving
fraudulently. In contrast, Lu (2014) investigated whether ex-
perts without personal monetary incentives also react to con-
sumers’ insurance status.
The author conducted a field experiment in which under-
cover testers visited doctors at hospitals in Beijing (China).
These testers explained to the doctors that they were sent on
the authority of a family member (patient) living in another
region of the country who wanted a doctor in a high-rated
hospital to have a look on his case.18 Therefore, two hy-
pothetical patients were designed and the testers brought
their reference sheets with medical test results indicating
18This procedure is very common in China (Lu, 2014).
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Figure 3: Relative Cumulative Frequency of Working Time19
different health problems which either required medica-
tion or not. After the tester had described the patient’s
health problems according to a fixed script, the doctor had
to decide whether to prescribe no drugs, generic drugs or
more expensive brand-name drugs and the package size.
The experiment was divided into four different treatments
which were randomly assigned to the doctors: Insurance-
incentive, no-insurance-incentive, insurance-no-incentive
and no-insurance-no-incentive. In the treatments with in-
surance, doctors received the information that the patient
was insured and, to the opposite, that he had no insurance
coverage in the no-insurance treatments. Additionally, in the
incentive treatments, doctors were informed that the tester
would buy the prescribed drugs for the patient from the doc-
tor’s hospital. This case created personal financial incentives
for physicians since their payments often depend on the rev-
enue generated in their hospital.20 The testers indicated that
the drugs would be purchased elsewhere in the no-incentive
treatments.
Evidence presented in Table 3 shows that when doctors
had financial incentives to prescribe more drugs or more ex-
pensive ones, patients paid 522 Yuan on average in the insur-
ance condition and 365 Yuan when they were not insured.
Therefore, insured patients had to pay 43% more for drugs
– which was highly statistically significant – since physicians
prescribed more brand-name drugs (83% vs. 68%), a higher
number (2.47 vs. 2.20) and more units of drugs (2.53 vs.
2.09) to insured.
These effects are displayed in the first column in Ap-
pendix 4. A possible reason for these results could have been
19Kerschbamer et al. (2016, p. 7456)
20In addition, hospitals in China often receive kickbacks from drug compa-
nies which also results in incentives for doctors to prescribe (Yip and Hsiao,
2008).
that doctors wanted to increase drug expenditures since their
income was calculated in proportion. An important finding
was that in the no-incentive treatments average outcomes
were not statistically different between insurance statuses as
can be seen from the second column in Appendix 4. Hence,
physicians did not respond to the patients’ insurance sta-
tus when they did not expect any profits from prescriptions.
By comparing the insurance-incentive to the insurance-no-
incentive treatment, the author found out that doctors with
incentives prescribed significantly more unnecessary drugs21
to insured patients (second line in Table 3). The number and
units of drugs were also significantly higher, but the share
of branded drugs was almost equal in both treatments (83%
and 81%). Overall, given insurance, financial incentives for
doctors increased the average drug expenditures for patients
significantly.
In this experimental study, adverse selection and first-
degree moral hazard did not play a role either since testers,
who were randomly assigned to the treatments, received ex-
act instructions for their behavior. In addition, the testers
indicated that they were not the patient who needed the doc-
tor’s advice and, therefore, the testers’ characteristics should
have had little impact on the doctors’ behavior (Lu, 2014).
However, Lu (2014) does not completely rule out the pos-
sibility that doctors’ inferred information from the conver-
sation with the tester may have influenced the results. For
instance, although the author implemented two elements to
make the doctors aware of the patients being neither poor
nor rich, the doctors could have assumed that patients who
did not want the drugs to be purchased in the hospital were
more price sensitive since – according to Lu (2014) – prices
21One hypothetical patient had increased triglycerides, but, according to
medical guidelines, the patient should have not received medication for
this level of triglycerides (Lu, 2014). Therefore, it was possible to test for
overtreatment.
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Table 3: Average Treatment Outcomes22











Raw drug expenditure (Yuan) 522.11 365.14 -
s.e. (35.80) (23.63) -
Prescription for triglycerides (0/1) 0.64 0.40 0.28 0.40
s.e. (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Monthly drug expenditure D&H (Yuan) 424.78 298.71 324.50 307.03
s.e. (23.54) (15.84) (18.95) (15.44)
Number of drugs D&H 2.47 2.20 2.18 2.18
s.e. (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Unit of drugs D&H 2.53 2.09 2.16 2.12
s.e. (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Share of branded drugs D&H (0-1) 0.83 0.68 0.81 0.80
s.e. (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Obs. for triglycerides 25 25 - -
Obs. for other variables 49 49 49 49
at outside pharmacies can be below the ones in hospitals.
Besides, it would have been optimal to visit each doctor for
all four treatments to control for heterogeneity between the
doctors, but Lu (2014) argument that presenting the same
test results multiple times to each doctor would have caused
suspiciousness among physicians seems plausible.
The first laboratory experiment discussed in this paper
was conducted by Huck et al. (2016) who investigated the
effects of medical insurance and competition on patients’ and
physicians’ behavior with a focus on overtreatment. They did
not only find second-degree moral hazard, but also evidence
for first-degree moral hazard. The experiment consisted of
four treatment variations – CONTROL, INS, treatment with
competition (COMP) and treatment with insurance and com-
petition (INS-COMP) – which are explained in the following.
In CONTROL, 336 students were randomly assigned to a
fixed role as a physician or as a patient. The patients were
confronted with a problem which required treatment. In
each round, the patients were randomly matched to a physi-
cian and the severity of their problem (mild or severe) was
determined. Then, patients had to choose – without know-
ing the severity of their problem – whether to consult their
assigned physician or not. If a patient consulted a physician,
he was able to observe the severity of the problem and chose
the treatment (patients had to pay for treatments). In the
case of a severe problem, the physician only had the option
to provide a severe (and more costly) treatment to the patient
as presented in Figure 4 whereas in case of a mild problem,
the physician also had the opportunity and monetary incen-
tives to overtreat. This means offering a severe treatment
22Lu (2014, p. 161); Due to space limitation, the complete table cannot
be presented in this part of the paper, please see Appendix 3.
although a mild treatment would have been sufficient for a
cure and less expensive for the patient. The payoffs resulting
from each condition can be observed from parentheses in Fig-
ure 4: The upper numbers are patients’ payoffs while lower
numbers are those of physicians. At the end of each round,
patients who consulted their physician received information
about their treatment, but still not about the severity of their
problem. This type of information was only given to those
who decided not to consult. All subjects also learned about
their payoffs after each round.
INS was almost equal to the above-described process,
but all patients – even the ones not consulting a physician
– had to pay a fair premium to cover extra costs of overtreat-
ment. An additional difference was that prices for severe and
mild treatments were – in contrast to CONTROL – identical.
Hence, a single patient did not have to bear higher costs re-
sulting from unnecessary overtreatment alone. The premium
was calculated dependent on the number of severe treat-
ments provided i.e., the more severe treatments provided the
higher the premium. Patients were aware of this calculation
method and received information about the paid premium at
the end of the rounds.
In COMP, patients were allowed to freely choose among
all physicians which was defined as competition. In addition,
patients and physicians observed the number of patients who
had consulted the physician in previous rounds (i.e., market
shares) from a history table. Finally, in INS-COMP, INS and
COMP were combined to one treatment.
Huck et al. (2016) found out that insurance induced
moral hazard on both sides of the market. Table 4 which
summarizes average results from all rounds and for all treat-
ments shows that 36% more patients consulted a physician
in INS than in CONTROL because additional costs of treat-
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Figure 4: Game Tree of CONTROL with Actual Payoffs23
Table 4: Results from All Treatments24
Notes: The table shows averages over all 30 periods and 7 markets in the main treatments. The rates in the first four lines are indicated in percent: (1) is
the share of consulting patients, (2) is the share of consulted physicians who give severe treatment when the problem is mild, where the average rate (2) is
weighted by the number of consultations per session and period. (3) is the sum of actual earnings over the sum of potential earnings. (4) is the share of all
interactions when appropriate treatment is provided. Average earnings in (5) and (6) are indicated in points.
BASE COMP INS INS-COMP
(1) consulting rate 40.7 54.7 55.3 83.1
(2) overtreatment rate 26.3 7.2 70.9 34.2
(3) efficiency rate 61.2 70.5 71.5 89.5
(4) correct treatment rate (CTR) 29.6 49.7 16.2 54.9
(5) average earnings physicians 9.1 11.5 14.4 19.1
(6) average earnings patients 6.8 7.2 5.7 6.4
ment were paid by the collective.25 The overtreatment rate of
70.9% was about three times the level in CONTROL (26.3%).
Physicians had additional incentives to overtreat because
they assumed that patients were less concerned about the
costs. Overall, only 16.2% of patients received a correct
23Huck et al. (2016, p. 85)
24Huck et al. (2016, p. 87); The column BASE represents results from
CONTROL.
25This effect was not significant according to a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test (Huck et al., 2016). More information on the test results is provided in
Appendix 5.
treatment in INS – compared to 29.6% in CONTROL.26 How-
ever, the effect of insurance was stronger in the context of
competition: Insurance increased the consulting rate by 52%
from 54.7% to 83.1% and the overtreatment rate (34.2%)
was about five times as high as in COMP (7.2%).
The lowest overtreatment rate (7.2%) was measured in
26To measure efficiency, the correct treatment rate instead of the efficiency
rate is used since the latter does not take overtreatment as an inefficiency
into account i.e., efficiency is high even when all patients consulted, but all
were overtreated.
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COMP compared to CONTROL (26.3%), INS (70.9%) and
INS-COMP (34.2%) since competition provided incentives
for physicians to avoid a severe treatment when a mild treat-
ment would have been sufficient. Overtreating physicians
were less likely to be consulted and therefore under pres-
sure not to overtreat. Probably the most important finding
was that competition27 on the seller side outweighed some
of the moral hazard effects: On the one hand, competition
increased the consulting rate from 55.3% in INS to 83.1%
in INS-COMP. But on the other hand, competition reduced
physicians’ overtreatment behavior by 48% from 70.9% to
34.2% yielding almost the level in CONTROL. As a result, the
correct treatment rate raised from 16.2% in INS to 54.9% in
INS-COMP.
In the following section, the methodology will be criti-
cally discussed. In general, an important advantage of lab-
oratory experiments is the ability to control most aspects of
the environment, but such experiments may have limited
relevance for individuals’ actual behavior in real-world situa-
tions (lack of external validity) since subjects typically know
that they are part of an experiment and the environment
might not be fully representative (e.g., students as subjects)
(Richter et al., 2014; List and Reiley, 2008). Adverse selec-
tion was ruled out because patients’ problems were drawn
randomly for each round and there was no option to not
insure or to choose different coverage levels. According to
Huck et al. (2016), the findings should only be interpreted
in a healthcare context with fee-for-service remuneration
systems i.e., where physicians take advantage from offering
high-level treatments. Hence, one drawback may be that the
authors did not frame the experiment in a medical context
(e.g., physicians were called “advisers”). The authors named
several reasons for doing so, but this feature may have in-
fluenced patients’ consulting decision since consumers are
probably more sensitive about their decision when it comes
to their health rather than in other contexts (e.g., problem
with their car). Moreover, another disadvantage of the ex-
periment is that patients did not suffer from physical conse-
quences (e.g., pain) after not consulting a physician. Feeling
such negative consequences may have had a stronger impact
on the patients consulting decision for the following rounds
than just learning the severity of the problem. Additionally,
the difference in patients’ payoffs between not consulting and
consulting and receiving the right treatment was very small
(see Figure 4). It should be mentioned that especially in
the case of a severe problem this seems unrealistic although
the severe treatment was very expensive. Contrariwise, the
value for a person of being cured is difficult to measure and
may differ from person to person. The experiment focused
on over-treatment and, therefore, undertreatment and no
treatment were excluded, but both cases may occur in real
situations. Furthermore, it was assumed that physicians
diagnose the problem correctly which is obviously an unreal-
istic assumption for the real world. Reputational incentives
27The authors state that the strong effect of competition was due to free
choice of physician rather than to observability of market shares.
for physicians were weak since patients only knew whether
their problem had been solved but had no idea about the
necessity of the treatment. However, such incentives may
be important to mitigate overtreatment since patients could
have been more confident not to be overtreated, especially,
in the context of competition. A doctor’s reputation (e.g.,
internet portals like sanego) may have an influence on the
number of consulting patients.
3.2. First-Degree Moral Hazard
Results from the prediscussed experiment also demon-
strate evidence of first-degree moral hazard. Thus, the re-
maining part of this paper analyzes this phenomenon. Pre-
vious studies found, for instance, that moral hazard is less
likely to occur under deterministic losses (Berger and Her-
shey, 1994) and with low probabilities of obtaining income
loss compensation (Di Mauro, 2002).
Mol and Botzen (2018) were the first to experimentally
study the existence of moral hazard in a market for natural
disaster risk insurance. To be more specific, the causal effects
of different financial incentives, probability levels, behavioral
characteristics and deductibles on homeowners’ damage re-
ducing investments were examined.
In a laboratory experiment, participants played an invest-
ment game on computers for which they were randomly as-
signed to five different treatments: CONTROL, INS, treat-
ment with premium discount (DISCOUNT), treatment with
loan (LOAN) and treatment with loan and discount (LOAN-
DISCOUNT). In CONTROL, subjects had no insurance cover-
age whereas in INS, participants were covered by insurance
including a deductible. All treatments, except for CONTROL,
implied insurance coverage and a deductible. In DISCOUNT,
subjects were offered a premium discount proportional to
their investment in damage reduction. In the fourth treat-
ment – LOAN – participants were able to distribute their in-
vestment costs over multiple rounds at an interest rate of 1%.
Subsequently, LOAN-DISCOUNT combined the previous two
treatments.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants earned
their starting capital through an effort task in order to pur-
chase a virtual house which was prone to flood risk. The rest
of the starting capital was subjects’ savings which could have
been used to pay for investments, insurance premiums and
damages. Altogether, participants played 6 scenarios28 con-
sisting of 12 rounds with differing flood probabilities and de-
ductible levels for each scenario (see Table 5). The scenarios
started with the presentation of flood probability, estimated
maximum flood damage and deductible level on subjects’
screens. On the next page, which is displayed in Appendix
6, subjects were asked how much they wanted to invest in
reducing the damage of a flood in the following rounds. For
this purpose, five investment levels were proposed each spec-
ifying the costs for the investment, the amount by which the
28After each scenario, the savings were automatically restored to the start-
ing value (Mol and Botzen (2018).
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Table 5: Overview of Scenarios29
Insurance treatments
Deductible
Extra Low (5%) Low (5%) High (20%)
Low probability (3%) LxL LL LH
High probability (15%) HxH HL HH
No Insurance treatments
Probability 1% 3% 5% 10% 15% 20%
damage will be reduced and the resulting deductible if the
house was flooded. After the subjects’ decision, the premium
and the investment costs were subtracted from the savings.
Then, subjects observed a map indicating 100 houses under
which their house was marked. The software randomly se-
lected the flooded house(s) according to the flood probability
and indicated the flooded house(s) in blue on the map (see
Appendix 7). If a subject’s house was flooded, the deductible
– or the damage in CONTROL – was paid from his savings.
In the following round, subjects could have either invested
more or remain with their investment while a reduction was
not allowed. Additionally, in LOAN an extra page to pay the
loan costs was displayed to subjects. In the end, questions
and decision tasks were presented to participants in order to
obtain their behavioral characteristics.
The authors found out that average investments in dam-
age reducing measures increased with the expected value
of damage (i.e., higher probability of flood and/or higher
deductible) for CONTROL and INS which can be seen in
Figure 5. In the first round of INS, average investments
were greater than zero for high and low-probability sce-
narios. Moreover, subjects invested significantly less in INS
than in CONTROL in scenarios with high probabilities (15%)
while such an effect was not found for low probabilities
(3%). These results suggest the existence of moral hazard in
scenarios with high probabilities, but not under low proba-
bilities. Therefore, moral hazard may be less of a problem in
natural disaster insurance markets with low probabilities of
loss and high expected damages.
The results from Table 6 prove that premium discounts in-
creased investments in damage mitigation significantly com-
pared to INS. But in LOAN, participants were not more likely
to invest more than in INS. Consequently, the combination of
loan and discount did not generate the highest investments
as hypothesized by the authors.30
Furthermore, participants’ behavioral characteristics such
as risk aversion, perceived effectiveness of protective meth-
ods and concern about flooding had a positive impact on the
investment decision. However, females invested significantly
29Mol and Botzen (2018, p. 8)
30Indeed, premium discounts alone led to the highest investments in the
game (Mol and Botzen, 2018).
more than males and individuals with high incomes in real
life invested less compared to low-income participants. It was
also found that subjects who had already experienced a flood
invested extra in damage reduction afterwards, but this effect
was not found when a neighbor’s house had been flooded.
One drawback – as in many other laboratory experiments
– is that study participants were largely students who may
have not been representative subjects to study moral hazard
in a flood insurance context because of less knowledge and
experience with damage reducing investments compared to
real homeowners. This could explain the result from LOAN
since students may have generally disliked lending money or
were put off by the interest rate (Mol and Botzen, 2018). In
addition, investment costs were distributed across 12 rounds
which lasted in the experiment at most several minutes while
costs are spread over multiple years in the real world (Mol
and Botzen, 2018). Smith (1982) stresses that salient payoffs
– rewards for individuals’ participation in the experiment that
are related to participants’ realized outcomes – are impor-
tant in laboratory experiments.31 Such payments need to be
incentive compatible i.e., payments create incentives for sub-
jects to behave according to their real preferences (Jaspersen,
2016). Therefore, an advantage of the experiment was the
implementation of an incentive-compatible payment scheme:
At the end of the experiment, all subjects were paid their fi-
nal savings from one randomly selected scenario additionally
to a participation fee (Mol and Botzen, 2018). Another point
is that, for ethical and practical reasons, it is not possible to
let subjects lose money for real in an experiment (Etchart-
Vincent and l’Haridon, 2011; Jaspersen, 2016). In order to
solve this problem, subjects had to perform an effort task in
which they earned their initial endowment from which they
lost without affecting their own money. It is important in
experiments to make subjects believe that the earned (and
lost) money is theirs in order to make them aware of losing
instead of gaining money in the game. Otherwise, subjects
may keep their endowment in mind when making decisions
and consider their outcomes as gains causing biases in their
31Camerer and Hogarth (1999) found out that salient rewards change par-
ticipants’ behavior in experiments.
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Figure 5: Average Investment in INS and CONTROL32
Table 6: Average Investment in the First Round for All Insurance Treatments33
Baseline Insurance Loan Discount Loan+Discount Kruskall-Wallis test
scenario HH 5,421.49 3,711.86 9,233.33 8,614.04 χ2 = 37.670***
(5,431.01) (3,658.01) (5,732.35) (5,512.18)
scenario HL 4,049.59 2,847.46 8,416.67 7,807.02 χ2 = 43.713***
(4,843.98) (3,916.43) (5,681.64) (5,717.89)
scenario HxL 3,471.07 3,542.37 8,966.67 7,771.93 χ2 = 46.829***
(5,010.11) (5,032.04) (5,971.59) (5,840.19)
scenario LH 2,727.27 1,661.02 3,850.00 3,719.30 χ2 = 10.086**
(4,222.95) (3,412.00) (4,398.86) (4,806.08)
scenario LL 2,404.96 1,525.42 3,283.33 3,421.05 χ2 = 10.842**
(4,253.58) (3,650.02) (4,584.76) (5,119.81)
scenario LxL 1,793.39 1,406.78 3,550.00 2,087.72 χ2 = 19.308***
(3,976.84) (3,312.04) (4,560.05) (3,434.49)
Observations 121 59 60 58
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, st.dev in parentheses.
behavior (Harbaugh et al., 2010; Jaspersen, 2016).34
Moral hazard in teams35 may arise when team members
bear the costs of their effort for supplying inputs individu-
ally, but only the joint output is observable directly (Holm-
strom, 1982). This can cause a free riding problem: Agents
can cheat and rely on the performance of the remaining team
members when they are paid according to the team output
(Holmstrom, 1982; Corgnet et al., 2013). Corgnet et al.
32Mol and Botzen (2018, p. 17)
33Mol and Botzen (2018, p. 19); The column Baseline Insurance repre-
sents results from INS.
34However, Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) found the contrary.
35Holmstrom (1982) defines a team as a group of individuals whose pro-
ductive inputs are related.
(2013) investigated whether peer pressure36 through mon-
itoring is a solution to the problem of moral hazard in teams.
For this purpose, four treatments were designed: CONTROL,
treatment with team incentives (T), treatment with team in-
centives and visible peer monitoring (TVP) and treatment
with team incentives and invisible peer monitoring (TIP).
In a laboratory experiment, participants had to do a long,
repetitive and effortful work task which consisted of sum-
ming up tables. When a subject had completed a table, he re-
ceived information about his accumulated individual produc-
tion: The production increased by 40 Cents when the table
36Mas and Moretti, 2009 define social (or peer) pressure as the experience
of disutility when being observed working less hard than others.
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was completely correct and decreased by 20 Cents for each
incorrect given answer in the table. Moreover, at the end of
each period, participants were informed about the total profit
generated by their team (10 group members). Anytime dur-
ing the experiment, subjects could have surfed the Internet
which was an alternative activity to the work task not gen-
erating any profits. Since both activities were undertaken on
different screens completing tables while browsing simulta-
neously was not possible. Additional to the prementioned ac-
tivities, subjects could have clicked on a yellow box on their
screen which was the clicking task. The box appeared ev-
ery 25 seconds on the screen and by clicking on it, 5 Cents
were earned by the subject.37 As a consequence, subjects
could have earned money constantly without actually work-
ing on the working task and while being on the Internet. In
CONTROL, subjects had individual incentives and received
payments for the work task according to their individual pro-
duction whereas in T, rewards were based on the total pro-
duction of all group members (subjects obtained 10% of the
total production). The third treatment variation – TVP – was
similar to T except for the introduction of an option for peer
monitoring in order to create peer pressure. Subjects were
allowed to click on a watch option on their screen to observe
other participants’ activities in real time. During monitoring
others, the working task and the leisure activity could not
have been continued while proceeding with the clicking task
was possible. After selecting the watch option, monitors were
informed about each subject’s activities (work task, brows-
ing or watching), production and the individual input to the
work task expressed as a percentage. Additionally, monitored
subjects received a notification on their screen that they were
currently being watched. In TIP, participants did not receive
such a notification.
The results indicated that individual production38 per pe-
riod increased (except for period 3) under individual and
team incentives showing evidence of a learning effect. Sub-
jects evolved strategies to compute the tables more quickly.
Figure 6 illustrates the interesting finding that average pro-
duction per subject was significantly lower in T (2.83 tables)
than in CONTROL (4.21 tables) yielding a difference of 49%
between the two incentive schemes due to shirking behav-
iors.
The following results are important since a highly signif-
icant negative correlation between Internet usage and indi-
vidual production for treatments with individual and team
incentives was detected: A comparison of Internet usage re-
vealed that the average time spent with browsing was signifi-
cantly higher in T (28.5%) than in CONTROL (11.9%) which
can also be seen in Figure 7.39 Under team incentives, the
37This feature represented the payment an employee receives only for be-
ing present at his workplace (Corgnet et al., 2013).
38Production is defined as the monetary amount generated from working
on the work task divided by 40 Cents. Thus, production is the number of
correctly computed tables minus the number of false answers (Corgnet et al.,
2013).
39According to the authors, 40.9% and 11.7% of subjects never surfed the
Internet under individual and team incentives, respectively.
average proportion of time spent on the Internet of 28.5%
decreased to 13.1% with the introduction of peer monitoring
in TVP resulting in values almost similar to CONTROL (see
Figure 7). This showed a clear impact of peer monitoring on
subjects’ choice of activity. Especially, visible monitoring was
effective since Internet usage was significantly lower in TVP
than in TIP.
Average production was 47% higher under peer pres-
sure (in TVP) than in T which was interpreted as evidence
of a strong peer pressure effect while no significant differ-
ences between TVP and CONTROL were found as shown
in Figure 8. Therefore, visible peer monitoring combined
with team incentives allowed production levels as high as un-
der individual incentives supporting the authors’ expectation
that peer pressure eliminates the problem of moral hazard in
teams. Social pressure was essential for the effectiveness of
monitoring since production levels were significantly lower
in TIP than in TVP and almost as high as under team incen-
tives.
An advantage of the methodology was that subjects could
have switched to the leisure activity since access to the Inter-
net at the workplace is very common in organizations and
according to a recent survey of Salary.com (see Appendix 8),
64% of employees visit websites which are not related to their
working activity every day. The study also revealed that one
of the most time-consuming activities employees waste their
time with on the job is surfing the Internet. Corgnet et al.
(2013) conducted the invisible monitoring treatment (TIP)
with the objective of eliminating the role of social pressure
in contrast to TVP. Yet, subjects knew about the possibility
of monitoring others and may have felt watched even with-
out a notification on their screen. Therefore, social pressure
may not have been completely eliminated (Corgnet et al.,
2013). This hypothesis was supported by the finding of a
slight difference in Internet usage between TIP (19.8%) and
T (28.5%). In the experiment, intrinsic motivation40 was re-
duced through the introduction of a long and laborious work
task because of the aim to investigate behavior under dif-
ferent incentive schemes. Corgnet et al. (2013) stated that
intrinsic motivation would have been a confounding factor,
but individual production may not always be driven only by
extrinsic motivators such as the payment. For instance, the
work itself or recognition should also be taken into consid-
eration when conducting experiments on teamwork. Only
large teams consisting of ten individuals were studied, but
much work in organizations is performed by small teams. By
keeping teams small it may be easier to increase the trans-
parency of subjects’ individual contribution to the output pos-
sibly even without monitoring.
In the absence of peer pressure, Biener et al. (2018) stud-
40Intrinsic motivation is defined as performing an activity because of the
activity itself (perceived enjoyment) and not because of achieving valued
outcomes (perceived usefulness) (Teo et al., 1999).
41Corgnet et al. (2013, p. 16)
42Corgnet et al. (2013, p. 26)
43Corgnet et al. (2013, p. 23)
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Figure 6: Average Production in CONTROL and T41
Figure 7: Average Internet Usage for All Treatments42
Figure 8: Average Production for All Treatments43
M. Huber / Junior Management Science 5(4) (2020) 410-428424
ied whether pro-social preferences44 between agents mitigate
moral hazard in joint liability group contracts. At the begin-
ning of the experiment, all participants played the same effort
game for three rounds: Subjects obtained an initial endow-
ment45 W and were confronted with a lottery in which they
had to draw one of ten balls from a bag containing four or-
ange and six white balls. The orange balls indicated a loss
of L while white balls represented no loss. Subjects were
offered the opportunity to self-protect by replacing the bag
with another bag with two orange and eight white balls in
exchange for effort costs of e. The probabilities and payoffs
for the basic and the self-protection game are presented in
Table 7.
Subsequently, subjects were randomly assigned to one
of five treatments for the remaining three rounds: CON-
TROL, treatment with individual insurance and low cover-
age (Ilow), treatment with individual insurance and high
coverage (Ihigh), treatment with group insurance and pri-
vate information (Gprivate) and treatment with group insur-
ance and public information (Gpublic). In CONTROL, subjects
played the above-described game for all rounds. The insur-
ance treatments – in which subjects paid a premium in each
round in order to only bear the deductible in case of a loss –
were divided into individual insurance and group insurance.
The individual insurance treatments Ilow and Ihigh included
different coverage levels i.e., deductibles – a high deductible
leading to low and a low deductible resulting in high cov-
erage, respectively. The group insurance treatments Gprivate
and Gpublic were similar to Ilow concerning deductible and
premium, but insurance covered groups of two individuals
and losses which were not covered by insurance (i.e., losses
below the deductible) were shared among them. In Gprivate,
self-protection was private information which means that the
peer was not able to observe the other’s risk-taking behavior
whereas in Gpublic this information was provided at the end
of the round.
The experiment was conducted two times. First, with ru-
ral villagers from the Philippines who brought a friend or a
relative of choice to the experiment. Therefore, it was possi-
ble for the experimenters to manipulate the network strength
within the groups. Second, in a computer laboratory setting,
the behavior of students from Germany was studied. In this
variation, participants could not have identified their group
members.
Biener et al. (2018) found strong evidence for moral haz-
ard meaning that subjects’ effort to self-protect decreased
with increasing insurance coverage, i.e., when making the
44Meaning that individuals are also concerned with other individuals’ pay-
offs, not only with their own ones (Levitt and List, 2007).
45After each round, the initial endowment was restored to the starting
value (Biener et al., 2018).
46Own representation based on Biener et al. (2018)
47Biener et al. (2018, p. 241); The bar C represents results from CON-
TROL.
48Biener et al. (2018, p. 241); The bars represent the proportion of indi-
viduals choosing self-protection who had positive (a) and negative (b) beliefs
about their peer’s self-protection effort.
payoff less state-dependent as illustrated in Figure 9. From
Figure 9 one can also observe that this effect was significantly
stronger in the German sample. However, moral hazard was
mitigated with joint liability in the group scheme. In Gprivate,
self-protection increased compared to Ilow by 6.8 percent-
age points in the Philippine sample and relative to Ihigh by
15.6 and 27.3 percentage points in the Philippine and the
German sample, respectively. According to the authors, this
effect was driven by individuals with positive beliefs about
their peer’s self-protection behavior. Subjects with positive
beliefs (bar (a)) were more likely to self-protect themselves
compared to individuals with negative beliefs (bar (b)) as
can be seen in Figure 10. This indicates that positive be-
liefs about the group member increased pro-social motives
and trust in the peer influenced the subject’s own behavior.
Also, results suggested that strategic motives (such as fear
of punishment) can further improve effort provision in non-
anonymous groups: Slightly higher self-protection was de-
tected in Gpublic compared to Gprivate, but only for the Philip-
pine sample. For both samples, mean self-protection for sub-
jects with positive beliefs was almost similar in both group in-
surance treatments while only in the Philippine experiment,
a difference was found for subjects with negative beliefs. To
be more specific, the mean proportion of self-protecting in-
dividuals was 18.3 percentage points higher in Gpublic. These
results are presented in Appendix 9.
Network strength, i.e., group composition, was expected
to influence the degree of pro-social and strategic motives
to provide self-protection. Indeed, in the Philippine experi-
ment, whether a group was formed out of friends and rela-
tives (strong group) or of random persons (weak group) did
not cause a significant difference in outcomes of Gprivate and
Gpublic (see Figure 11). It was only found that the outcome
difference between Gpublic and Gprivate was larger in strong
groups. A possible reason may be that, if self-protection be-
havior is observable for the peer, image concerns play a larger
role in non-anonymous groups. Anyway, it is important to
mention that even random individuals from the same village
may have known each other.
With regard to the methodology, it can be said that one
major advantage was the execution of the experiment in two
independent and different environments. Once, with low-
income rural villagers from the Philippines and again with
students from Germany. In consideration of the fact that the
main results were found for both experiments and, therefore,
hold independently of culture and experience with financial
services, one can attribute them further credibility, according
to Biener et al. (2018). In contrast to the experiment by
Mol, Botzen and Blasch, subjects did not earn their initial
endowment through an effort task. Instead, they received
a so-called windfall payment at the beginning meaning that
participants were endowed with money without considera-
tion (Jaspersen, 2016). According to Jaspersen (2016), the
experimental design was constructed incentive compatible
through using a “random problem selection mechanism”.
This means that subjects had to take multiple self-protection
decisions during the experiment, but earnings for subjects’
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Table 7: Payoffs and Probabilities46
Payoff (Probability)
Basic Game Self-Protection Game
No Loss W (60%) W-e (80%)
Loss W-L (40%) W-e-L (20%)
Figure 9: Mean Proportion of Self-Protecting Participants47
Figure 10: Mean Proportion of Self-Protecting Participants by Beliefs48
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Figure 11: Mean Proportion of Self-Protecting Participants by Group Composition49
participation were determined by randomly selecting one
round out of six (in addition to a show-up fee). Biener et al.
(2018, p. 237) write in their paper that they “explained the
[. . . ] payout mechanism to all participants in advance”. It
remains unclear whether the term “in advance” means that
participants received this information several days or minutes
before the experiment. Actually, the point of time of receiving
this information is crucial for participants’ behavior in exper-
iments since subjects who find out about receiving payment
for their participation not before arriving at the experiment
are less risk averse compared to individuals who are told one
to five days before (Arkes Hal et al., 1994; Jaspersen, 2016).
Another drawback may be that initial endowments varied
between the two experiments. For the Philippine sample,
the endowment was considerably above participants’ aver-
age daily income while it was approximately 70% of the
daily income of the German students (Biener et al., 2018).
To stress the impact of such payments on behavior, consider
that Ackert et al. (2006) found evidence in an experiment
where they varied initial endowments that traders who ob-
tained a higher initial endowment at the start were more
risk-taking resulting in higher bids.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine the circum-
stances under which moral hazard is likely to occur and how
this problem could be mitigated or eliminated. To summa-
rize, moral hazard had a significant impact on service provi-
sion in markets for credence goods. It was found that moral
49Biener et al. (2018, p. 244)
hazard on the demand side, in addition to personal financial
incentives for service providers to behave fraudulently, led to
second-degree moral hazard. When taxi drivers were aware
of the moral hazard problem between the passenger and his
employer, they were more likely to overcharge (Balafoutas
et al., 2017). This is in line with Kerschbamer et al. (2016)
findings. However, Lu (2014) showed that the elimination
of such personal incentives caused non-existence of second-
degree moral hazard: Physicians who expected to receive
a fraction of patients’ drug expenditures wrote 43% more
expensive prescriptions to insured while doctors without fi-
nancial incentives did not respond to the insurance status.
Moreover, Huck et al. (2016) findings revealed the powerful
effects of competition between experts to mitigate second-
degree moral hazard. Indeed, insurance induced moral haz-
ard on both market sides, but competition outweighed some
of these effects. On the one hand, the consulting rate was in
fact significantly higher with competition, but on the other,
overtreatment was moderated. As already explained, this
experiment also showed evidence of first-degree moral haz-
ard in a health insurance context. In contrast, moral haz-
ard was found to be less of a problem in natural disaster in-
surance markets with low probabilities of damages (Mol and
Botzen, 2018). Insurance premium discounts and higher ex-
pected damages (i.e., higher probabilities of loss and higher
deductibles) increased homeowners’ investments in damage
reduction measures (Mol and Botzen, 2018). As expected,
moral hazard was present when team members were paid
according to their joint output. Average production levels
were significantly lower and Internet usage was significantly
higher under team incentives than under individual incen-
tives. By introducing visible peer monitoring, subjects’ per-
formance under team incentives was as high as under individ-
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ual incentives supporting the authors’ expectation that peer
pressure eliminates the problem of moral hazard in teams
(Corgnet et al., 2013). Also studying joint liability group
contracts, but in an insurance context, Biener et al. (2018)
stressed the role of pro-social preferences to alleviate moral
hazard. The higher subjects’ insurance coverage was, the
more decreased mean effort to self-protect against losses, but
when insuring groups of two, self-protection increased be-
cause subjects were motivated by pro-social concerns.
Overall, the results suggest moral hazard to be an im-
portant problem in many markets. From the considered
experimental studies, circumstances for its occurrence and
mitigation measures were derived (see Appendix 10 for an
overview). However, as Cohen and Siegelman (2010) pro-
posed for proceeding with the research on adverse selection,
one should identify the circumstances under which moral
hazard emerges – as it was done in this paper – instead of
aiming at a once-and-for-all conclusion on its existence.
In the context of second-degree moral hazard, some gen-
eral research questions are still unanswered. First, little at-
tention has been paid on how different insurance schemes
such as co-payments affect sellers’ provision behavior (Ker-
schbamer and Sutter, 2017). Second, even though insurance
companies often reimburse costs for services only if they were
provided by their contract partners, Kerschbamer and Sutter
(2017) are not aware of studies investigating whether insur-
ance companies’ partners actually behave less fraudulently.
Third, although Lu (2014) found out that experts who did
not profit from overtreatment or overcharging did not pre-
scribe insured and uninsured individuals differently, the re-
lationship between personal incentives and provision behav-
ior and the impact of different incentive schemes for expert
sellers have not been analyzed in detail (Kerschbamer and
Sutter, 2017). Fourth, the experiment with competition only
implemented free choice of physicians, but the effect of price-
competition may be of importance as well. Fifth, in terms
of the presence of the Digital Age, one topic for future re-
search could also be the impact of digital technologies as for
example platforms like “Uber” and “sanego” on mitigating
moral hazard. Such platforms may allow for decreasing in-
formational asymmetries between sellers and customers in
credence goods markets because of customers’ possibilities to
rate their experiences with a specific physician or to real-time
monitor their “Uber” driver. And, since the previous point is
in a way related to reputational incentives it may also be im-
portant to study how those affect service provision behavior.
With regard to first-degree moral hazard, future research
could address the behavior of actual homeowners, instead of
students, in regions that are prone to flood risk in order to in-
crease representativeness. An additional point could be the
investigation of the effect of financial incentives in natural
disaster insurance markets where insurance is not manda-
tory. Cohen and Siegelman (2010) write that the existence
of moral hazard is an important reason for using deductibles
in insurance contracts. However, in the experiment by Mol
and Botzen (2018), deductibles had an influence on ex ante
damage reduction, but this effect was rather small which
raises the question of the usefulness of high deductibles in
such markets pointing out a further research topic. Further-
more, since behavior in group insurance schemes may de-
pend on the group size it would be interesting to study the
effect of different group sizes on moral hazard and, espe-
cially, whether moral hazard can also be mitigated with an
increasing group size where free riding may be more likely
to remain undetected and pro-sociality may decrease. An-
other academic void is the existence of ex post moral hazard
in group insurance schemes. Finally, the finding that strate-
gic motives can further improve subjects’ effort provision in
non-anonymous groups could have been driven by cultural
factors since strong groups were only studied in the Philip-
pine sample (Biener et al., 2018). Therefore, it would be
interesting for follow-up research to investigate whether this
effect is also robust across cultures and social classes.
M. Huber / Junior Management Science 5(4) (2020) 410-428428
References
Ackert, L. F., Charupat, N., Church, B. K., and Deaves, R. An experimental
examination of the house money effect in a multi-period setting. Experi-
mental Economics, 9(1):pp. 5–16, 2006.
Arkes Hal, R., Joyner Cynthia, A., Pezzo Mark, V., Gradwohl, N. J., Karen, S.-
J., and Eric, S. The psychology of windfall gains. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 59(3):pp. 331–347, 1994.
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, J. E. Moral hazard and nonmarket institutions: Dys-
functional crowding out of peer monitoring? The American Economic
Review, 81(1):pp. 179–190, 1991.
Arrow, K. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 53(5):pp. 941–973, 1963.
Arrow, K. Agency and the market. In: K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intriligator, Publ.
1986. Handbook of Mathematical Economics. Vol. 3. [e-book] Amsterdam
et al.: North-Holland Pub. Co. , 1986. URL http://www.ub.uni-muenc
hen.de/. accessed on 13.04.2019.
Balafoutas, L., Kerschbamer, R., and Sutter, M. Second-degree moral hazard
in a real-world credence goods market. The Economic Journal, 127(599):
pp. 1–18, 2017.
Berger, L. A. and Hershey, J. C. Moral hazard, risk seeking, and free riding.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 9(2):pp. 173–186, 1994.
Biener, C., Eling, M., Landmann, A., and Pradhan, S. Can group incentives
alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences. European
Economic Review, 101:pp. 230–249, 2018.
Camerer, C. F. and Hogarth, R. M. The effects of financial incentives in ex-
periments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1-3):pp. 7–42, 1999.
Cohen, A. and Siegelman, P. Testing for adverse selection in insurance mar-
kets. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(1):pp. 39–84, 2010.
Corgnet, B., Hérnan-Gonzalez, R., and Rassenti. Peer pressure and moral
hazard in teams: Experimental evidence. Working Paper, No. 13-01, Or-
ange, CA, Economic Science Institute at Chapman University, 2013.
Di Mauro, C. Ex ante and ex post moral hazard in compensation for in-
come losses: results from an experiment. The Journal of Socio-Economics,
31(3):pp. 253–271, 2002.
Dulleck, U. and Kerschbamer, R. On doctors, mechanics, and computer spe-
cialists: The economics of credence goods. Journal of Economic Literature,
44(1):pp. 5–42, 2006.
Ehrlich, I. and Becker, G. S. Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-
protection. Journal of Political Economy, 80(4):pp. 623–648, 1972.
Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. Moral hazard in health insurance: What we
know and how we know it. Journal of the European Economic Association,
16(4):pp. 957–982, 2018.
Etchart-Vincent, N. and l’Haridon, O. Monetary incentives in the loss domain
and behavior toward risk: An experimental comparison of three reward
schemes including real losses. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 42(1):pp.
61–83, 2011.
Finkelstein, A. and McGarry, K. Multiple dimensions of private information:
evidence from the long-term care insurance market. American Economic
Review, 96(4):pp. 938–958, 2006.
Harbaugh, W. T., Krause, K., and Vesterlund, L. The fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes in choice and pricing tasks. The Economic Journal, 120(545):
pp. 595–611, 2010.
Holmström, B. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics,
10(1):pp. 74–91, 1979.
Holmstrom, B. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2):
pp. 324–340, 1982.
Huck, S., Lünser, G., Spitzer, F., and Tyran, J.-R. Medical insurance and free
choice of physician shape patient overtreatment: A laboratory experi-
ment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 131(B):pp. 78–105,
2016.
Jaspersen, J. G. Hypothetical surveys and experimental studies of insurance
demand: A review. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 83(1):pp. 217–255,
2016.
Karten, W., Nell, M., Richter, A., and Schiller, J. Risiko und Versicherung-
stechnik: Eine ökonomische Einführung. [e-book] Wiesbaden: Springer
Gabler. Under: LMU Universitätsbibliothek, 2018. URL http://www.ub
.uni-muenchen.de/. accessed on 13.04.2019.
Kerschbamer, R. and Sutter, M. The economics of credence goods - A survey
of recent lab and field experiments. CESifo Economic Studies, 63(1):pp.
1–23, 2017.
Kerschbamer, R., Neururer, D., and Sutter, M. Insurance coverage of cus-
tomers induces dishonesty of sellers in markets for credence goods. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(27):pp. 7454–7458,
2016.
Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. What do laboratory experiments measuring social
preferences reveal about the real world? Journal of Economic Perspectives,
21(2):pp. 153–174, 2007.
List, J. A. and Reiley, D. Field Experiments. In: S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume,
pp. 2117–2120. The new Palgrave dictionary of economics. 2nd edition.
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
List, J. A. Field experiments: A bridge between lab and naturally occurring
data. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 6(2):pp. 1–45., 2006.
Lu, F. Insurance coverage and agency problems in doctor prescriptions: ev-
idence from a field experiment in China. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 106:pp. 156–167, 2014.
Mas, A. and Moretti, E. Peers at work. American Economic Review, 99(1):pp.
112–45, 2009.
Mol, J. and Botzen, J., W.J.W. and Blasch. Risk reduction in natural disaster
insurance: Experimental evidence on moral hazard and financial incen-
tives. Working Paper, No. 2018-10, University of Pennsylvania, Philadel-
phia, 2018.
Nell, M. Das moralische Risiko und seine Erscheinungsformen. In: Frank-
furter Vorträge zum Versicherungswesen. Volume 29. Karlsruhe: Verlag
Versicherungswirtschaft, pp. 7-33, 1998.
Pauly, M. V. The economics of moral hazard: Comment. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 58(3):pp. 531–537, 1968.
Richter, A., Schiller, J., and Schlesinger, H. Behavioral insurance: Theory and
experiments. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 48(2):pp. 85–96, 2014.
Salary.com. Articles. [online], 2018. URL https://www.salary.com/art
icles/why-how-your-employees-are-wasting-time-at-work/.
accessed on 21.04.2019.
Smith, V. L. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. The Ameri-
can Economic Review, 72(5):pp. 923–955, 1982.
Teo, T., Lim, V., and Lai, R. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in Internet
usage. The International Journal of Management Science, 27:pp. 25–37,
1999.
Viaene, S. and Dedene, G. Insurance fraud: Issues and challenges. The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 29(2):pp. 313–333, 2004.
Yip, W. and Hsiao, W. C. The Chinese health system at a crossroads. Health
Affairs, 27(2):pp. 460–468., 2008.
